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"DUALISM, CAUSATION AND SUPERVENIENCE" 
Stewart Goetz 
In this paper, I assume that the idea of a substantial soul is essential to many 
religions and defend against two recent critics a Cartesian dualist view that 
a soul can causally interact with its physical body. The two critics are Ernest 
Sosa and Jaegwon Kim. Both argue that the idea of causal interaction between 
a soul and its physical body is problematic, if not incoherent. Because it is, 
a noncausal account of the relationship between the psychological and the 
physical must be developed. These writers suggest that the concept of super-
venience be employed to explain how psychological properties/events are 
related to physical properties/events. This is a property or event dualism. I 
argue that this form of dualism is less plausible than substance dualism. 
I 
[A] mind-body dualism seems to be essential to most religions. The body 
will disintegrate after death but, according to the doctrines of many religions, 
the soul, the immaterial part of us which is quite distinct and different from 
the body, will live on eternally .... The primary philosophical problem is to 
find out whether dualistic interactionism or some other position is the most 
plausible view about the nature of a person. I 
I believe that the authors whom I have just quoted are correct about the 
relationship between mind-body dualism and religion. However, I will make 
no effort in this paper to defend their claim. Rather, assuming they are correct, 
I will attempt to defend against two recent critics the intelligibility of a 
Cartesian substance dualist's view that a self or soul can causally interact 
with its physical body. 2 These critics suggest that this view is problematic or 
implausible, if not impossible or unintelligible. I am not convinced that it is 
any of these. In the place of substance dualism, it is now common to substitute 
a dualism of properties and/or events and claim that psychological proper-
ties/events supervene on physical properties/events. I believe that this form 
of dualism is less plausible than substance dualism. 
In Section II, I set out a dualist's account of what it means to say that a 
certain physical body is 'my body.' This account says that a certain physical 
body is mine because I causally interact with it. The critic of dualism main-
tains that causal interaction cannot be the relation which makes a particular 
physical body 'mine.' This is because a causal relation supervenes on a 
noncausal relation and there is no suitable noncausal relation between my 
body and me which makes it possible for it to cause events in me and for me 
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to cause events in it. I examine to what extent causation is a supervenient 
relation. 
Section III consists of an investigation of whether or not the concept of 
supervenience is of any help in explaining the relationship between the psy-
chological and the physical. Many believe that, in light of the problem of 
causal interaction for dualism, we can introduce the concept of supervenience 
to elucidate how the psychological is related to the physical. I believe that 
they are mistaken. Contrary to clarifying this relationship, accounts which 
invoke supervenience are totally inadequate as accounts of the relationship 
between the psychological and the physical. Supervenience might be of philo-
sophical use elsewhere, but it is of no use in the mind-body problem. 
II 
Before setting forth the argument against causal interaction, I will briefly 
introduce the reader to the causal ontology I will be using in this paper. On 
my account, causation involves the idea of (i) a substance and the causal 
power had by it; (ii) a substance and the causal liability had by it; (iii) the 
exercise of the causal power and (iv) the actualization of the liability. Cau-
sation consists in the exercise of a causal power by a substance upon itself 
or another substance, where this exercise of power produces an actualization 
of a liability. A causal power and its corresponding liability are onto logically 
irreducible properties had intrinsically or per se by a substance or substances. 
I employ this account of causation for the following reasons. First, we are 
entities which have powers and liabilities. For example, we have the power 
to think, the power to choose, the power to move, etc. We also have the 
liability to experience pain and the liability to be moved. Consider the liabil-
ity to be moved. We have been or can conceive of being moved in one way 
or another by a causal power such as that which is associated with a moving 
fist, car, train, herd of cattle, etc. Those who doubt that there is such causal 
power only need place themselves in the path of these or similar entities to 
be convinced otherwise. Even Hume, who maintained that none of us, as 
agents, has an experience of the exercise of causal power, in the end had to 
admit that, as patients, we experience the activity of causal power on us in 
the determination of our minds to pass from one object to its usual attendant.3 
Second, not only do we possess powers and liabilities, but also it is plau-
sible to think that other entities possess or have associated with them powers 
and liabilities. For example, SUbmicroscopic entities such as protons, elec-
trons, etc. are conceived of as entities with positive and negative charges, 
where these charges are forces or powers to move other submicroscopic 
entities which have the liability to be moved. 
With this ontology before us, I now turn to the question of causal interaction 
between a soul and its body. 
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Why is this body 'my body'? According to a dualist, it is not because I am 
identical with this body. Rather, it is mine because of a certain causal rela-
tionship in which I stand to it. Thus, this body is my body because, when it 
is causally affected, it regularly and directly causes me to have certain expe-
riences (e.g., pain) and when I act my actions4 regularly directly5 cause its 
movements.6 On this account, were I regularly to have the experience of pain 
directly caused by your body or the table on which I am now writing when 
they were causally affected in certain ways, then I would regard either or 
both of them as my body. Similarly, were your body or the table regularly 
directly caused to move by my actions, I would regard either or both of them 
as my body. 
A dualist analyzes what it is for my physical body to be 'my body' in terms 
of causation. Ernest Sosa has acknowledged that this is a promising analysis 
of ownership until we consider what it is in virtue of which a causal relation 
obtains. According to Sosa, a causal relation obtains only if the appropriate 
noncausal conditions obtain. Consider the following two examples: 
Someone takes a picture of you, a photograph. Your image is imprinted on a 
piece of film. The film is imprinted with an image of a face that looks a 
certain way because you have a certain physiognomy. But your physiognomy 
causes the image on the film only in virtue of the fact that certain conditions 
hold at a given time with respect to you and the piece of film. The film is in 
a camera aimed in your direction, and you and the camera are not too far 
apart, there are no obstacles obstructing the line of sight, you are facing the 
camera at the time, and there is enough light, and so on; and it is only in 
virtue of the fact that these conditions all hold that your facial appearance 
causes the image on the film .... 
Take another example. A karate expert hits a board and splits it in two. The 
board splits in two because of the blow by the man. And if this is so it is 
presumably in virtue of certain noncausal conditions that hold at the time, 
including the board's thickness; its composition; the angle, speed, and force 
of the blow, etc. And it seems quite evident, moreover, that if anything 
noncausally a perfect twin of that board, is hit by anyone non causally a 
perfect twin of that man, with a blow exactly like that blow in all noncausal 
respects, then that new board must also split just as did the old, because of 
the blow.? 
Now, according to the substance dualist, there are many physical bodies and 
many souls. What noncausal properties and/or relations make events in one 
physical body causally relevant to a specified soul, and events in a specified 
soul causally relevant to a particular physical body? Could it be the noncausal 
relationship of ownership, so that a particular soul and a particular physical 
body causally interact only if that soul owns that body? But what is the sense 
of 'owns' here? Is it legal or moral? Did the soul inherit its physical body or 
earn it as the fruits of its labors? The obvious answer is, 'No.' 
At this point, says Sosa, many dualists explicate ownership in terms of 
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direct causal interaction. We are told by them that what makes a particular 
physical body the body of a specific soul is that the two directly causally 
interact. But if we then go on to ask in virtue of what noncausal relation it 
is that the two directly causally interact, the dualist is unable to provide us 
with an answer. The answer cannot be that a particular physical body and a 
specific soul causally interact in virtue of the fact that that body is owned by 
that soul, because ownership is supposed to be explained in terms of causal 
interaction. Moreover, ownership cannot be explained in terms of a certain 
spatial relation, because a soul is supposedly not in space. In the end, it seems 
as if all that can be said is that the physical body which is supposedly the 
body of a particular soul causally interacts with that soul, period. But this 
will not do. 
For it is useless to be told that what makes something subject to direct causal 
interaction with something else is that it is indeed subject to direct causal 
interaction with it. And that is precisely what the answer by reference to 
ownership [explained in terms of causation] ... resolves to under analysis. 
Our picture begins to look bleak for immortal souls. What pairs physical 
objects as proper mates for causal interaction is in general their places in the 
all-encompassing spatial framework of physical reality. It is their spatial 
relations that pair the piece of film with the man photographed, and distin-
guishes him as the cause from the billions of other men in existence including 
exact look-alikes. One consequence for interactionism is that there can be no 
interaction between an immaterial soul and a material body. That of course 
has been the view of so many, since Gassendi to the present, that it is firmly 
settled as a platitude of introductory philosophy.8 
In conclusion, Sosa says that causation is a relation between events, but not 
between events of souls and physical bodies. According to him, the causal 
relation between the mental and the physical is a supervenient relation be-
tween mental and physical events. As a supervenient relation, the causal 
relation between any two events x and y goes something like this: 
The having of property P [where P is, say, mental in nature] by event 
x ... causes event y to have property Q [where Q is, say, physical in na-
ture] ... iff there are [noncausal] properties of x, including P, and noncausal 
properties of y, and a [noncausal] relation R between x and y, such that it is 
nomologically necessary that whenever an event has such properties of x and 
bears relation R to some other event with such properties of y, then that other 
events also has Q.9 
Now, I do not believe it is the case that one object is subject to the causal 
influence of another object only in virtue of their noncausal relations to one 
another and their noncausal properties. On Sosa's view, the causal terms of 
a causal relation are not able to enter into such a relation in virtue of any 
causal properties they possess intrinsically or per se, but they only acquire 
their causal properties by first entering into a noncausal relation which is, 
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say, spatial in nature. Stated differently, all causal properties are possessed 
extrinsically or in dependence upon the entrance into a noncausal spatial 
relation. This view is very similar to the more general ontological thesis that 
substantial objects or entities, including causal agents and affected patients, 
do not possess their numerical identity intrinsically (they are not intrinsically 
individuated), but rather they possess their numerical identity in terms of their 
spatial relations to other subjects (they are extrinsically individuated). On 
both views, being a spatial relation is the primary ontological category, not 
the substantial objects and their causal properties which are the terms of the 
relations. 
I believe that Sosa is largely mistaken in his account of causation. Just as 
a spatial relation is not the individuating principle of the substantial objects 
which are its terms, but those objects are intrinsically individuated, so also 
a spatial relation is not the individuating principle of the relevant causal 
properties possessed by the terms of the causal relation, but these are indi-
viduated intrinsically and possessed essentially by their bearers. As I stated 
at the beginning of this section, a causal relation obtains or is primarily a 
function of the causal power and liability of the agent and patient objects, 
respectively. A causal relation obtains when a substance which possesses 
causal power exercises that power to produce the actualization of a liability. 
The power of an agent and the liability of a patient are ontologically irreduc-
ible and intrinsic or per se causal features of those objects. They are not 
derivative or supervenient properties. A causal agent has a power to produce 
an effect and a patient has the liability to be affected by a causal agent before 
entering into a causal relation. In Sosa's terminology, what 'pairs' the agent 
and the patient objects in a causal relation is the agent's exercise of its causal 
power upon the patient, where this exercise of causal power actualizes the 
respective liability of the patient. Like the causal properties of which it is a 
function, the causal relation is irreducible. 1o 
In light of these comments about the nature of causal properties, let us 
consider Sosa's examples of the physiognomy and film and the board and 
karate expert. How could these examples be explicated in terms of causal 
powers and liabilities? With regard to the physiognomy and film, the former 
has the causal power to imprint its image on the film which has the liability 
to receive this image. The provision of light can reasonably be understood as 
the exercise of a causal power by some agent. In the case of the board and 
karate expert, the board has a causal liability to break which is a function of 
its thickness and composition. The board's thickness and composition can 
reasonably be understood as determined by the organization or arrangement 
of the parts of the board. Each part of the board is immediately spatially 
related to a contiguous part and has the causal liability to be split apart from 
its contiguous part. Therefore, the causal liability of the board to be split can 
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be explained in terms of the liabilities of the parts which compose it to be 
separated from their respective immediately contiguous parts. The liability 
to be separated or split apart is identical with the liability to be moved, the 
liability to be moved being possessed by any body per sell. The liability to 
be moved is properly understood as causal in nature in that it is actualized 
by a causal power. Thus, a liability to be separated from a contiguous part is 
actualized by a causal power. If the parts of the board are themselves com-
plex, their liabilities to be split apart (moved) will be further explained in the 
way that the original board's liability to be broken is explained. Therefore, 
contrary to Sosa, rather than the thickness and composition of the board being 
noncausal conditions of the board's splitting upon being hit by someone or 
something such as the karate expert, they are explicable or analyzable in 
terms of causal liabilities. 
With regard to the speed and force of the karate expert's blow, I believe 
that these are causal, not noncausal, features of the action. The speed and 
force of the blow are characteristics of the karate expert's exercising of his 
power to move. The angle of the blow is a spatial relation between the board 
and the hand's movement. 
Enough has been said about these specific examples. In general, a causal 
relation obtains when a causal power is exercised and actualizes a liability. 
This is an irreducible relation which cannot be explained in noncausal terms. 
But is it, nevertheless, a dependent relation in the sense that it cannot obtain 
unless some other noncausal relation obtains? After all, Sosa could accept 
everything I have said about causation up to this point, yet maintain that an 
agent can only exercise its causal power upon a patient when the two objects 
are spatially related. In this case, causation would be an irreducible but 
dependent relation. 
I believe the causal relation is dependent in nature. When there are two 
objects, one with the causal power to affect the other, these two objects must 
stand in a relation which is such that the patient is 'accessible to' the agent's 
exercised causal power in the sense that it can be causally affected by it. Were 
no such accessibility relation to obtain, the agent would exercise its causal 
power without affecting the patient. However, what is not evident is that this 
accessibility relation upon which the causal relation depends must be spatial 
in nature. 
It seems false to maintain that standing in a spatial relation is sufficient for 
standing in a causal relation. While being spatialized imposes the condition 
that the agent of a causal relation stands in a spatial relation to the patient of 
that relation, this does not imply, as Sosa suggests, that it is because or in 
virtue of this spatial relation that the causal agent is causally paired with the 
affected patient. As I have already explained, they are causally paired in 
virtue of the agent's exercise of its causal power which is directed upon and 
98 Faith and Philosophy 
actualizes the patient's liability, and the agent has the power to do this and 
the patient has the liability to have this done to it (logically, if not temporally) 
prior to their entering into this spatial relation. Thus, if an agent and patient 
are in space, they will have to be in a spatial relation with each other when 
they enter into a causal relation. But their being spatially related is not 
sufficient for their being causally related. They could exist in the spatial 
relation without being causally related because the one is not exercising its 
causal power upon the other. 
A spatial relation between two objects is not a sufficient condition of a 
causal relation obtaining between them. Is it a necessary condition? Not 
obviously. An important issue here is the existence of a nonspatial object. If 
such an object can exist, then it is not obvious that it cannot interact causally 
with an object located in space. If a philosopher such as Descartes has good 
reason for believing that he is a soul which is nonspatial in nature, and if he 
also has good reason to believe that a certain physical body is his in virtue 
of causally interacting with it, then he has good reason to believe that there 
must be another relation in which he stands to his body, where this relation 
is distinct from yet makes possible the causal interaction between his soul 
and body. This is the case, even if he cannot state what this relation is. 
Moreover, this position is different from that which says "that what makes 
something subject to direct causal interaction with something else is that it 
is indeed subject to direct causal interaction with it."12 
What reason does a dualist have for believing that he is a non spatial entity? 
Classically, the reason given is that the self is a simple entity with no sepa-
rable parts. Because it is simple in this way, it is indivisible and that which 
is indivisible is nonextended and, thereby, nonspatial. 13 Moreover, it is im-
portant to stress that the dualist's belief about the soul's simplicity is not a 
philosophical aberration. On the contrary, opponents of dualism recognize 
that this belief is implicitly held by every ordinary person. Thus, Thomas 
Nagel maintains that, in concept at least, the identity of the self is apparently 
strict, perfect, and unanalyzable. The self has an apparent unique simplicity 
and indivisibility which are seemingly nonnegotiable essential features. 14 
Derek Parfit is another philosopher who recognizes that it is natural to believe 
that the self is a separately existing entity which is both distinct from its brain 
and body and has a simple and indivisible nature. IS Given (1) the truth of the 
'simple' view of the self and the fact that what is simple is indivisible, 
nonextended and, thereby, nonspatial and (2) the truth that a soul and its body 
causally interact, the dualist has strong support for his belief that there must 
be an accessibility relation between the two which makes their causal inter-
action possible. 
In response, Sosa might claim that no person who has a good reason for 
believing that he is a nonspatial entity can have an additional good reason 
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for believing that he causally interacts with a certain physical body, without 
also having a knowledge of another noncausal relation in which he stands to 
that body and which makes it causally accessible to him. However, it seems 
to me that such a claim is no more obvious than the nonobvious claim that a 
spatial relation is a necessary condition of causal interaction between two 
entities. Therefore, if a dualist is correctly convinced that his reasons for 
believing that he is a nonspatial entity and that he causally interacts with a 
physical body are better than any reasons he is given for believing that there 
can be no relation between a non spatial soul and a physical body which makes 
possible causal interaction between the two, then he will be justified in 
asserting the possibility of such a relation, even though he does not know 
what it is. 16 
III 
Many philosophers will be very uncomfortable with understanding causation 
as an ultimate and irreducible relation insofar as it makes possible a view 
such as substance dualism. It makes such a view possible insofar as it grounds 
the possibility of causal interaction between a physical body and a nonphysi-
cal self or soul. As long as the two kinds of entity have the requisite powers 
and liabilities and the patient's liability is accessible to the agent's exercised 
causal power, causal interaction between them is possible. 
Opponents of substance dualism have often insisted that the irreducible 
nature of causation, as it relates to the interaction issue, makes the latter a 
brute relation and, therefore, unintelligible. It is simply incomprehensible 
how a nonphysical or spiritual entity could causally interact with a physical 
entity. For example, according to Jaegwon Kim, there is "the sheer impossi-
bility of coherently imagining the details of what might have to be the case 
if some nonphysical agency is going to affect the course of purely physical 
events .... "17 Acknowledging some nonphysical agency 
would force us to accept a conception of the physical in which to give a 
causal account of, say, the motion of a physical particle, it is sometimes 
necessary to go outside the physical system and appeal to some nonphysical 
agency and invoke some irreducible psychophysical law. Many will find this 
just not credible. IS 
In the end, substance dualist interactionists can only say that the agent and 
her physical body causally interact, and that is that, period. The interaction 
is just a brute fact that has to be acknowledged. For many philosophers such 
as Kim, this is very difficult to accept. 
For the moment, let us assume that Kim's difficulty in accepting substance 
dualism because of the irreducible nature of psychophysical causation on that 
view is justified and let us also assume, as he does, that the psychological 
and physical worlds causally influence each other. In Kim's terms, there is 
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psychophysical causation, but it is not between psychological and physical 
substances. Now, what are the alternatives to substance dualism? Like Sosa, 
Kim proposes that we regard the psychological as supervening upon the 
physical. Psychological causal relations are supervenient causal relations. 
According to Kim, the supervenience thesis is an expression of the broader 
metaphysical thesis (what I will term 'physicalism') that the psychological 
world is the way that it is because the physical world is the way that it is. It 
is Kim's conviction that the psychological is ultimately and completely de-
pendent on or determined by the physical, and the concept of supervenience 
is invoked in an attempt to explicate this dependence. 
The problem for the supervenience theorist is this. He has charged that the 
substance dualist's interactionist position is problematic because the sub-
stance dualist allegedly cannot coherently say how or in virtue of what it is 
that a psychological entity causes an effect event in a physical entity (or vice 
versa). All he can say is that it does. The alleged bruteness of this causal 
relation is supposedly a significant problem for the substance dualist's view 
of the world. However, prima facie, the asserted ultimate and complete de-
pendence of the psychological on the physical in the physicalist's view of the 
world seems to be no less brute than the bruteness of the causal relation in 
the substance dualist's world view. 
Ultimately, how or why a fundamental physical event causes another physical 
event may be as much of a mystery as how or why raw feels and perceptual 
images emerge from the electro-chemical activities going on within the gray 
matter in our skulls. 19 
Thus, if in response to the question 'How, or in virtue of what does the 
psychological depend on the physical?' the physicalist can say no more than 
'It just does,' his view seems to have at its heart just as serious a problem as 
it is claimed the substance dualist has at the heart of his view. But why, then, 
jettison substance dualism for physicalism? 
Does the concept of supervenience explain to us how the physical deter-
mines the psychological? I do not believe that it does. To understand why it 
does not, consider the following explanation of supervenience by Kim: For 
families of properties A and B, to say that A supervenes on B is to say that, 
necessarily, for each object x and each property F in A, if x has F, then there 
is a property G in B such that x has G and, necessarily, if any y has G, it has 
F. When properties F and G are related in the specified way, F is supervenient 
upon G and G is a supervenience base of F. With regard to the question of 
the psychological supervening on the physical, we can think of the psycho-
logical and physical as families of properties and let A be the psychological 
family of properties and B be the physical family.20 
On this account of supervenience, says Kim, it is possible to interpret the 
first occurrence of 'necessarily' as metaphysical necessity and the second as 
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nomological; it is also possible to interpret both as metaphysical, or both as 
nomologicaI.21 Moreover, a property in A can have multiple supervenient 
bases in B. Thus, one object x has F and its supervenience base is G. However, 
some other object y can have F and not have G but G* as its supervenience 
base. What is necessarily the case is that when certain properties account for 
F in one case, any other case in which those properties are exemplified must 
also be a case in which F is exemplified. In addition, event supervenience 
can be explained in terms of property supervenience. An event, x's having F, 
supervenes on the event, x's having G, if and only if x has G and G is a 
supervenience base for F.22 
With this explanation of supervenience before us, we can now ask: What 
does the supervenience thesis explain about how the psychological world is 
determined by or dependent on the physical world? Do we know or have we 
learned anything about how, or in virtue of what it is that the physical world 
is primary and completely determines the psychological world? So far as I 
can determine, we have not learned anything with regard to this issue. We 
have simply been told that, necessarily, whenever an object has a psychologi-
cal property F, there is some physical property G on which it depends and, 
necessarily, anything else which has G will also have F. But having said this, 
we have not had it explained to us how the psychological world is determined 
in the way that it is by the physical world. It is one thing to say that all things 
having the same supervened upon properties must have the same supervenient 
properties. It is another thing to say that the former explain the latter, or that 
something has the latter in virtue of or because it has the former. Is not the 
supervenience theorist merely saying the first thing and no more? It would 
certainly seem SO.23 
Not only does the concept of supervenience not explain anything to us 
about the alleged dependence of the psychological on the physical, but also 
it is doubtful that the concept of supervenience captures an essential feature 
of this alleged dependency. The dependency which Kim claims obtains be-
tween the psychological and the physical is an asymmetric relation: the psy-
chological family of properties is dependent upon the physical, but not vice 
versa. Now, if we consider Kim's concept of supervenience, it becomes clear 
that properties related via supervenience need not be related asymmetrically. 
For the sake of argument, I will stipulate that the nature of things is such that 
not only is it true that (i) necessarily, in any world where an entity exemplifies 
a psychological property F, that entity also exemplifies a physical property 
G, and, necessarily, if any other object has G, it also has F, but also it is true 
that (ii) necessarily, in any world where an entity exemplifies a physical 
property G, that entity also exemplifies a psychological property F, and, 
necessarily, if any other object exemplifies F, it also exemplifies G. In other 
words, the psychological and physical families of properties are coextensive. 
102 Faith and Philosophy 
I will call this view of the nature of things the 'animist view.' Not only 
does the animist think that whenever there is a psychological property, there 
must also be a related physical property, but also he believes that whenever 
there is a physical property there must also be a related psychological prop-
erty. On the animist's view, not only is every physical object in this world 
necessarily 'ensouled,' but also any physical object in any world is necessar-
ily ensouled. The animist believes that the following statement by Kim is 
false: "[A]lthough psychophysical supervenience is an arguable view, it 
would be manifestly implausible to hold that the physical supervenes on the 
psychological."24 Perhaps Thales was an animist when he said that all things 
are full of gods and the magnet has a soul because it moves iron. 
Regardless of how one understands Thales, what is clear is that given the 
animist's view and Kim's definition of supervenience, not only would it be 
true to say that the psychological supervenes on the physical, but also it would 
be true to say that the physical supervenes on the psychological. In order to 
convert the animist's view into the physicalist's view, the physicalist would 
have to add the further condition that the physical determines the psychologi-
calor the latter is in some way asymmetrically dependent upon the former. 
But were he to say this, it would indicate that, in the end, an asymmetric 
dependence relation must be used to explicate physicalism and this depend-
ency cannot itself be understood in terms of supervenience.2s 
I am not advocating the animist's view. Rather, I am making reference to 
it to illustrate a case where supervenience is present, but symmetry is as well. 
So supervenience does not guarantee asymmetry. Hence, insofar as asymme-
try is needed for dependence, supervenience does not guarantee dependence 
either. Kim might respond that all my argument demonstrates is that depend-
ence is present only in those cases where the properties are in fact related 
asymmetrically via supervenience. But this is not adequate because an animist 
might want to endorse physicalism, i.e., he might want to say that, though 
the physical and psychological families of properties are coextensive, it is 
the physical which determines the psychological. Surely such an animist 
position makes sense. But it would not make sense on the suggested response 
by Kim. Thus, Kim seems to have no way to get dependence out of super-
venience alone. 
In the end, the dependency of the psychological on the physical in the 
physicalist's view is ultimate and irreducible. Moreover, if the ultimate and 
irreducible nature of the causal relation between the psychological and the 
physical is a fatal flaw in the dualist's view, the ultimate and irreducible 
nature of the dependence relation between the psychological and the physical 
is equally fatal for the physicalist'S view. To say that the ultimate nature of 
the relation between the psychological and the physical is not as fatal for the 
physicalist as it is for the dualist would imply that such an ultimacy in the 
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former's dependence relation is more intelligible than such an ultimacy in 
the latter's causal relation. But I am not aware of any reason for saying this 
that is supported by an examination of the natures of the relations themselves. 
Indeed, I believe that the ultimate nature of the causal relation in the dualist's 
view is more intelligible than the ultimate nature of the dependency relation 
in the physicalist's understanding of things. What is characteristic of both 
relations is that they are asymmetric in nature. But the dualist can say more 
about this asymmetry than the physicalist can. For the dualist, the causal 
relation is asymmetric because the causal entity (whether a soul or a physical 
entity) exercises its causal power to produce an effect event in the patient 
entity. It is the exercise of causal power which accounts for the asymmetry 
and makes the effect's occurrence dependent in nature. Unlike the dualist, 
the physicalist can only say that the psychological is dependent upon the 
physical, and that is the end of the matter. If either view involves a relation 
characterized by bruteness, it is the physicalist's view and not the dualist's. 
In the end, it is only the physicalist's prior assent to the broader metaphysi-
cal thesis that the psychological world is the way that it is because the 
physical world is the way that it is that supports his belief in the superiority 
of the dependence relation between the psychological and the physical over 
the dualist's causal dependence relation. How plausible, then, is this broader 
metaphysical thesis? I do not believe that it is plausible at all. Indeed, I 
believe that it is inherently implausible. The implausibility of the physicalist 
position becomes clear when one discovers that, on the physicalist view, 
psychological events have no genuine explanatory role to play in the world. 
I quote Kim at some length on the explanatory role of the psychological: 
The delicate task is to find an account that will give the mental a substantial 
enough causal role to let us avoid "the great paradox of epiphenomenalism" 
without infringing upon the closedness of physical causal systems. I suggest 
that we view psychological causal relations-in fact, all causal relations 
involving psychological events-as epiphenomenal supervenient causal re-
lations. More specifically, when a mental event M causes a physical event P, 
this is so because M is supervenient upon a physical event, p* , and p* causes 
P. This latter may itself be a supervenient causal relation, but that is no matter: 
what is important is that, at some point, purely physical causal processes take 
over. Similarly, when mental event M causes another mental event M*, this 
is so because M supervenes on a physical state P, and similarly M* and P*, 
and P causes P*. 
Thus, if a pain causes the sensation of fear an instant later, this account tells 
the following story: the pain is supervenient on a brain state, this brain state 
causes another appropriate brain state, and given this second brain state, the 
fear sensation must occur, for it is supervenient upon that brain state .... 
Does this proposal satisfy the desiderata we set for an adequate account of 
psychophysical causation? It would be foolish to pretend that the proposed 
account accords to the mental the full causal potency we accord to funda-
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mental physical processes .... Mental causation does take place; it is only that 
it is epiphenomenal causation, that is, a causal relation that is reducible to, 
or explainable by, the causal processes taking place at a more basic physical 
level.26 
Kim says that the supervenience theorist's account of psychophysical causa-
tion does not accord to the mental the full causal potency accorded to funda-
mental physical processes. Mental causation does take place, but it is 
reducible to causal processes taking place at a more basic physical level. As 
far as I can ascertain, Kim's account accords no real explanatory role to the 
psychological at all. His description of all causal relations involving psycho-
logical events as 'epiphenomenal' supervenient causal relations accurately 
indicates the lack of any explanatory role for the psychological. If any so-
called psychophysical causation only occurs because the 'causal' psychologi-
cal event is supervenient upon a causal physical event, it is difficult to 
understand how the psychological event is any more than an idle by-product 
of the physical system. Indeed, to ascribe any causal influence to the psycho-
logical event is to do so in name only. The fact that the psychological event 
supervenes on the causally efficacious physical event is not sufficient to make 
it true to say that the psychological event caused the effect. The psychological 
event played no part in bringing about the effect because, had the psycho-
logical event been absent, no difference in the course of events would have 
resulted. The psychological is no more than an epiphenomenon. 
In accord with his explication of supervenience, Kim will maintain that the 
psychological event could not have been absent and the same physical event 
have occurred. To this extent, the psychological has some causal role to play. 
But this is no genuine causal role and if we ask why the psychological event 
could not have been absent and the same physical event have occurred, there 
seems to be no other answer than that this is just the way the world is on the 
physicalist's broad metaphysical conception of things. The psychological just 
rides piggyback on the physical, period. 
Kim himself is not entirely convinced by his account of the relation be-
tween the physical and psychological in terms of supervenience. He also 
senses that his account leaves no genuine explanatory role for the psycho-
logical,27 Thus, he says it seems that the only way to preserve a genuine 
explanatory role for the psychological, other than advocating substance du-
alism, is to adopt the position that psychological properties (and, thus, psy-
chological events, for Kim regards an event as the exemplification of a 
property by an object at a time) are identical with the physical properties with 
which they are nomologically correlated. However, he recognizes that there 
are strong intuitions which suggest that the identity thesis is false. 28 Following 
Descartes, Saul Kripke has convincingly argued that there is the strong intui-
tion that a psychological property (or event) is essentially what it is and what 
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it is is not any kind of physical property. Any correlation between a psycho-
logical property and a physical property has an obvious element of contin-
gency about it. There is nothing incoherent in the supposition that one could 
be exemplified without the latter. Given the plausible assumption that any 
'two' things that are identical are necessarily so, it follows that no psycho-
logical property is identical with a physical property.29 
My uneasiness with Kim's physicalism arises out of my commitment to the 
view that, on at least some occasions, psychological processes are fundamen-
tal and physical processes are secondary. As an advocate of an agency theory 
which accords a noncausal yet full explanatory role to psychological reasons 
for acting, I believe that Kim's understanding of the psychological as epiphe-
nomenal in nature is totally inadequate.3o On the occasions when human souls 
act, what happens in the physical world is, in Kim's terms, completely and 
ultimately dependent upon what happens in the psychological world. Thus, 
a choice, being a free and uncaused psychological event, does not occur 
because it supervenes on a physical correlate. Rather, any physical correlate 
of the choice occurs because the choice occurs, and any events caused by 
that physical correlate occur only because the choice occurs. 
IV 
I conclude that there is no good reason for rejecting substance dualism on 
the basis of a supposed unintelligibility of the causal relation between the 
psychological and physical. There may be other problems with dualism, but 
this is not one of them. While the causal relation between the psychological 
and the physical is ultimate and irreducible, this is not a good reason for 
rejecting the view that the two causally interact. Those who employ the 
concept of supervenience to explicate the relation between the psychological 
and the physical also make use of an ultimate and irreducible dependency 
relation. There is nothing in the nature of this dependency relation which 
recommends it over the causal relation of the dualist. In fact, the nature of 
the dualist's causal relation recommends it over the physicalist's dependency 
relation. Moreover, when one reflects upon what explanatory role the psycho-
logical has in the physicalist's view of the world, one begins to realize that the 
dualist view of the world is not all that implausible. And this is good news for 
those who also have certain religious beliefs about the soul and life after death.31 
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